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JOBFINDING AND WAGE5 WHEN LONGRUN UNEMPLOYMENT 
15 REALLY LONG: THE CASE OF SPAIN 
This paper uses the "Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida Y Trabajoll (ECVT)·· 
a survey of the labor force activity of over 61,000 persons in Spain in 1985 
when unemployment exceeded 20%--to examine the effect of unemployrnent 
insurance (UI) and family status on longrun joblessness. It finds that (1) 
duratían of joblessness 1s 50me 30% longer for those eligible for UI benefits 
than for those ineligible for UI; (2) the longterm unemployed are 
disproportionately secondary workers for whom the family serves as a form of 
welfare; (3) hazard rates linking the chances of jobfinding to duration of 
unemployment in the 1981-85 period of massive joblessness did not decline 
with duration; (4) the length of unemployment spells reduces wages moderately 
but has huge effect on the probability that re-employed workers take 
secondary sector jobs; (5) the UI eligible earn more and are more likely to 
gain regular full-time jobs than those ineligible for UI, congruent with the 
additional months of Job search associated with UI. 
The estimated effects of duratían on the hazard and on earnings are 
consistent with the implications of labor supply and search analysis but not 
with the view that long unemployment spells create a class of unemployables. 
Our results imply a sizeable reduction in longterm unemployment with economic 
recovery. 
Alfonso Alba-Ramirez 
Facultad de Economicas 
University of Halaga 
29071 Halaga (Spain) 
Richard B. Freeman 
Harvard University and NBER 
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, HA 02138 
As the OECD country with the most severe unemployment problem 
in the 1980S" Spain offers an especially fruitful case for 
assessing the determinants and consequences of longrun 
unemployment. If unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are a majar 
cause of longrun unemployment,2 one would expect the Spanish UI 
system to be one of the most generous in Western Europe. If work 
skills deteriora te significantly as unemployment lengthens andjor 
if the most able obtain jobs first, one would expect the 
probability of escaping unemployment to fall with duration of 
joblessness. Finally, if the longterm unemployed are 
noncompetitive with the employed the wages and jobs they eventually 
obtain ought to differ significantly from those of the "insiders" 
who maintain their jobs. In this paper we use the "Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida y Trabajo" (ECVT) a survey of the labor 
force activity of over 61,000 persons in spain in 1985 when 
unemployment exceeded 20% -- to examine these expectations. We 
find that: 
l. unemployment insurance increases the length of unemployment 
substantially: hazard rates for escaping unemployment fall with 
duration of benefits and rise sharply after benefits are exhausted, 
so that duration of joblessness is some 30% longer for those 
eligible for UI benefits than for those ineligible for UI. 
2. The longterm unemployed are disproportionately secondary 
workers for whom the family serves as a form of unemployment 
insurance: women, older workers, and nonhousehold heads. 
3. Hazard rates linking the chances of jobfinding to duration 
of unemployment in the 1981-85 period of massive joblessness were 
constant or rising (depending on specification), ruling out a story 
of longterm unemployment in terms of its adverse impact on job-
finding. 
4. Wages fall moderately while the probability of entering the 
secondary sector increases markedly with length of unemployment for 
the displaced workers who obtain jobs. Re-employed persons 
eligible for UI earn more and are more likely to end up with 
regular full-time jobs than those ineligible for UI. The improved 
earnings associated with UI imply a reasonable payoff to the 
additional months of job search. 
Data: Tha ECVT survay 
We derive these conclusions from analysis of the ECVT Survey 
which the Spanish government conducted in the fourth quarter of 
1985 to obtain information on work history, underground economic 
activity, and earnings unavailable in the standard Spanish labor 
force survey, the "Encuesta de Población Activa" (EPA). Covering 
more than 61,000 persons aged 14 and over, the ECVT is the largest 
and potentially best cross section data set with which to analyze 
longrun unemployment in Europe in the 1980s. It includes over 
4,500 workers with a spell of unemployment, most lasting over a 
year, and contains questions on work histories that provide data on 
complete as well as incomplete spells of unemployment and on 
workers who changed jobs without unemployment. The ECVT's majar 
weakness is the absence of information on wages on the job prior to 
unemployment. To determine duration of unemployment on the ECVT, 
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we use a series of questions regarding mobility and work status. 
The key question asks respondents, "How many times have you 
changed firms?" An answer of once or more triggers questions about 
whether the most recent change involved a spell of unemployment, 
the reasons for the change, and characteristics of the previous 
jobo By excluding persons unemployed and recalled by the same 
firm, the ECVT bypasses problems created by the distinct search 
behavior of persons on temporary layoff (Katz 1986). The survey 
differentiates between involuntarily displaced workers (those whose 
firm closed or who were fired or permanently laid off, and those 
whose contract ended);' and those who left their jOb for voluntary 
reasons. A follow-up question, "After leaving this job, how long 
did you spend (or are you) out of work and actively looking for a 
i2Ql," allows us to identify those who sought work after losing 
their jobo 
We concentrate on the last spell of unemployment of displaced 
workers, giving us a sample al 4,517 workers who lost their job.' 
From the question on labor force status in the previous week, we 
determined that 1,896 of those who suffered joblessness were 
working, 1,365 were looking for work in that week,' and 1,256 were 
neither working nor looking lar work in the reference week. As 
comparison groupa, we also look at employed workers who were never 
unemployed during the periad: 858 respondents who changed jaba 
without a spell of unemployment, and 7,237 who never changed their 
job and were employed in the reference week." In several 
tabulations we distinguish between workers who lost their jobs 
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during the 1981-85 recession and those who lost their jobs in 
earlier years, which reduces our samples moderately. 
The unemployment data in the ECVT is consistent with published 
data on unemployment in Spain from the EPA survey. The rate of 
unemployment in the ECVT is approximately the same as in the EPA.' 
In our sample of displaced workers, 54' of all unemployment spells 
and 63' of incomplete spells lasted one year or more. This 
compares to EPA-based estimates of incomplete spells that 57% of 
the unemployed were out of work for one year or longer (OECD).8 
More detailed analyses of the ECVT (Muro et al. 1989) show that it 
is also broadly consistent with other information on the Spanish 
labor market, making it a valid survey from which to assess 
longterm unemployment in the country. 
Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the samples from 
the ECVT that we use. It record s the duration of joblessness, 
demographic characteristics, unemployment insurance eligibility, 
and reason for joblessness for: all displaced workers who suffered 
unemployment; those who were displaced but did not become 
unemployed; persons who remained at the same job during the 
period;" and the shortterm and longterm unemployed. In this table 
and throughout our analysis, we define the longterm unemployed as 
persons with 12+ months of unemployment if they were employed in 
the reference week or 6+ months if they were unemployed at that 
time. 10 
Comparing workers who lost their jobs (column 1) to those who 
were employed throughout the period and never changed firms (column 
4 
2), we see that the displaced jobless were more likely to be men, 
young, less educated and blue collar workers. They are less likely 
to have other family members working than workers with jobs. 
comparing workers who became displaced and experienced unemployment 
(column 1) with those who were displaced without unemployment 
(column 3), we see that younger workers, females, nonhousehold 
heads, and those displaced in 1981 and after are more likely to 
have suffered joblessness. Finally, comparing the longterm and 
shortterm displaced jobless (columns 4 and 5), we see that the 
longterm jobless are older (many young unemployed persons never 
obtained a first job and are thus excluded from our sample); are 
more likely to be female; and are more likely to have lost their 
job as a result of their firm shutting down or being laid off than 
other displaced workers. 
Th. Spanish UI System 
Economic analyses of longrun unemployment often stress the 
importance of UI in providing income for job losers that allows 
them to search for better jobs and remain jObless for extended 
periods of time (BUrdett 1979). Spain has a generous unemployment 
insurance system compared to most OECD countries (see OECD, 1988), 
which makes UI a potential cause of the long duration of Spanish 
unemployment. According to Spanish labor law, an individual 
involuntarily unemployed who contributed social security payments 
on the previous job for 6 or more months is eligible for UI 
benefits. The magnitude and duration of UI benefits have varied 
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over time. Prior to 1980 a worker received 80% of the average 
contributory wage in the previous six months of employment during 
the first 6 months of unemployment, 70% of that wage for the next 
six months, and 60% of that wage for an additional 6 months. After 
1980 the length of eligibility for U1 depended on tenure in the 
previous jObo 1f the previous job lasted between 6 and 12 months, 
the period of eligibility is 3 months, while for every 6 additional 
months of tenure in the previous job, eligibility increases by 3 
additional months to a maximum of 18 months. After 1984 the 
maximum duration of entitlement to receive U1 under the 
contributory system was extended to 24 months. Workers over 55 
were eligible for early retirement benefits, leading us to 
distinguish them from others in the analyses. 
The legally mandated differences in length of eligibility 
among workers with different work histories over time provides us 
with the variation in potential benefits needed to estimate how U1 
duration affects length of joblessness. Column 1 of Table 1 shows 
that in our sample 70% of the displaced jobless were eligible for 
U1; 17% were eligible for 3-6 months; 7% were eligible for 9-12 
months, and 46% were eligible for 15-18 months. The first 
indication that U1 may affect longterm unemployment can be seen in 
columns 4 and 5 of the table, which show that 77% of the longterm 
unemployed compared to only 58% of the shortterm unemployed were 
eligible for U1--a huge 19 point differential. 
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Datarminant. of Lonqtarm Un .. ployaant 
To assess the effect of UI eliqibility and other factors on 
lonqterm unemployment in Spain,l1 we decompose the probability of 
beinq lonqterm unemployed usinq conditional probabilities into: the 
probability of beinq lonqterm unemployed qiven that the worker i8 
displaced and jobless; the probability of beinq displaced and 
jobless conditional on beinq displaced; and the probability of 
beinq displaced. The probit equations in Table 2 estimate the 
determinants of these probabilities and also qive the probability 
of beinq currently employed conditional of havinq be en displaced 
and jobless. The column 1 calculation shows that, consistent with 
the means in Table 1, eliqibility for UI substantially raises the 
probability of lonqterm unemployment qiven that one becomes 
unemployed.'2 Accordinq to the estimated coefficients, a person 
with mean characteristics who was displaced but not eliqible for UI 
had a probability of beinq lonqterm unemployed of 54%; the .27 
coefficient in the table raises the probability by 11 percentaqe 
points to 65%. This is smaller than the 19 point difference in the 
probability of beinq lonqterm unemployed found in the table 1 means 
but still sizeable. While UI is not tha cause of lonqterm 
unemployment (some 23% of the lonqterm unemployed were not eliqible 
to receiva UI benefits; an additional 22% of the displaced workers 
were unemployed for more than two years, exhaustinq their 
eliqibility)'3 the calculation suqqests that it is an important 
contributinq factor. 
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The probit in column 1 al so shows that nonhousehold heads are 
more likely to be longterm unemployed than others. This is 
consistent with the notion that the longterm unemployed rely on 
their family for financial support -- i.e. that the strong family 
system substitutes for unemployment insurance. In fact, if we 
distinguish between the longterm unemployed by eligibility for UI, 
we flnd a remarkable dlfference ln household status. Whl1e a 
majorlty (62\) of the longterm unemployed who are eligible for UI 
are household heads, just 31\ of the longterm unemployed lneliglble 
for UI are household heads. We lnterpret thls to mean that 
dependents can afford to be longterm unemployed without UI but that 
household heads cannot. 
The probit ln table 2 gives the probabl1ity of belng currently 
employed conditional on having been dlsplaced and jobless. It 
shows that those ellgible for UI are less 11kely to be currently 
employed while those who are heads of households are more 11kely to 
be currently employed, conslstent wlth the column 1 findings on 
longrun unemployment. The educatlon and prevlous job tenure 
coefflclents obtain opposltely-slgned coefflcients consistent wlth 
the column 1 findings. 
In contrast to the estimated signlficant effect of UI 
ellglbility on belng longterm unemployed in column 1, the column 2 
estlmate ol the conditlonal probability of suffering unemployment 
glven displacement shows no UI impacto The impllcation ls that UI 
lengthens durations ol unemployment but does not affect the 
occurrence of unemployment given dlsplacement. Two factors appear 
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to ~A~lain this: one is that most displaced workers without 
unemployment (61') were displaced before 1981, when unemployment 
just began to grow in spain; the other is that a large proportion 
of those displaced without unemployment become self-employed (27% 
compared to 15% of displaced jobless workers). Finally, the column 
3 estimate of the probability of being displaced shows that older, 
more educated and white collar workers are less likely to have lost 
their job than other workers, but that household heads had neither 
a greater nor lesser chance of losing their job than others. As 
nearly all of those never displaced are eligible for UI, UI cannot 
be cited as a cause of displacement, though in some seasonal 
employment sectors it may be part of the industry's normal 
adjustment pattern. 
UI and Duration of Joble •• De.s 
To get a better fix on the effect of UI on duration of 
joblessness, we estimated Kaplan-Meier empirical survival 
functions
" 
for persons differentiated by months of UI eligibility. 
If UI affects the hazard rate, the survival function for those 
without UI should fall below the survival function for persons 
eligible for UI, and be lowest for those with the least 
eligibility. Figure 1, which records our estimated survival 
function., aupports both expectations: the lowest survival function 
is for the non-UI eligible; the next lowest is for those with 3-6 
months eligibility; the next ia for those with 9-12 months 
eligibility; and the highest is for those with 15-18 months 
9 
eligibility. While the absence of covariates leaves open the 
possibility that the differences reflect mea su red heterogeneity 
among the four groups, the figure makes a strong prima facie case 
that the duration of U1 benefits in Spain has played a role in 
extending spells of unemployment. 
Figure 2 takes the analysis a step further by recording the 
hazard rate for escaping unemployment by the length of time until a 
person with U1 exhausts his eligibility. 1t groups individual s by 
three month intervals to deal with the problem that people remember 
and report retrospective losses of jobs and job-finding in focal 
intervals of 1 month, half a year, a year, etc. A positive number 
on the horizontal axis mean s that the person has that number of 
months of eligibility remaining; a negative number implies that 
they used up their eligibility that many months ago. 1f U1 affects 
the hazard rate, we would expect lower hazards during the period of 
eligibility followed by a jump in the hazard around the time the 
individual loses eligibility and possibly greater hazards after 
loss of eligibility than during eligibility. The data support 
these expectations: the average hazard in the period when the 
persons have more than two months eligibility is .051; it jumps to 
.104 when eligibility falls from two months to minus six months, 
then averages .045 per month. 
To obtain a better fix on the shape of the hazard function for 
escaping joblessness, we calculated empirical hazards for all 
displaced persons and for those displaced in the 1981-85 period of 
high unemployment. We used 3-month grouped data and 1 year grouped 
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data to reduce the problem of reporting spikes. These hazards are 
displayed in Figure 3. The 3-month grouped data show spikes around 
12, 18, 24 months, which makes it difficult to determine the shape 
of the hazard. For persons displaced in 1981-85 the l-year grouped 
data gives a declining hazard for the first year and a relatively 
flat hazard thereafter; for all displaced persons, it gives a 
declining hazard for three years followed by a relatively flat 
hazard. Whether the initial drop in hazards is due to observed 
heterogeneity or other factors requires analysis of the effect of 
covariates on duration of joblessness, to which we turn next • 
• aibu11 and Coz Proportiona1 Basard Hodal. 
To control for covariates correlated with UI eligibility and 
with duration of joblessness, we first estimate a hazard model 
using the Wiebull distribution: h(t:x) = hO(t) exp (X'b) where 
hO(t) is an arbitrary baseline hazard for the duration of 
unemployment from the Wiebull family ata- t , and where the vector X 
reflects characteristics and b mea sures the effect of X on the 
hazard. In this formulation, the coefficient a reflects potential 
duration dependence, with a>l implying an increasing escape rateo 
We estimated the model by maximum likelihood, taking into account 
both uncompleted (censored) spells and completed spells. t , 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3 for the 
entire sample (column 1); for workers whose contract ended and who 
were thus likely to have anticipated job loss (column 2); for other 
job losers (column 3); and for persons who lost their job in the 
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period 1981-1985 (column 4). The dummy variables for U1 eligibility 
EL1G36, EL1G912 and EL1G1518 -- obtain significant coefficients 
in all of the calculations save for workers who lost their job for 
a reason other than their contract ending. One possible 
explanation is that workers on temporary jobs use U1 benefits to 
adjust to intermittent spells of joblessness, moving from one short 
run job to another, while those whose displacement comes as a 
complete surprise do not make such plans. The estimated scale 
coefficients are around unity in columns 1-3 and exceed unity for 
persons displaced in 1981-85 in column 4. All of these estimates 
reject the notion that the hazard rate falls with duration. 
How important is the estimated U1 effect on duration of 
joblessness? The magnitude of the coefficients on the U1 dummy 
variables in columns 1, 2 and 4 of Table 3 indicate that the effect 
is substantial in social as well as statistical terms. Though the 
coefficients increase only moderately between the eligibility 
categories, they all differ greatly from the O for the deleted U1-
ineligible group: for the entire sample duration of joblessness 
ranges from .20 to .26 ln points higher for those eligible for U1 
than for those ineligible for U1 (column 1); for those displaced in 
1981-85, duration ot joblessness is .21 to .34 ln points higher for 
those eligible tor U1 (column 4). Translated into months of 
unemployment, these estimates indicate that the U1 eligible are 
unemployed on the order of 4 to 6 months more than the ineligible! 
This result is, we stress, found in the raw mean s of our data and 
is thus not an artefact ot the Weibull modelo oividing the sample 
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between those eligible for UI and those ineligible for UI and 
calculating mean durations of joblessness for the two groups we 
find that the mean duration of completed spells was 17 months for 
persons eligible for UI compared to 11.4 months for those 
ineligible for UI; and that the mean duration of uncompleted spells 
was 26 months for the UI eligible compared to 18.2 months for the 
UI ineligible -- large differences by any reckoning.'· 
The coefficients on the other variables in the Table 3 
calculations provide additional insight into the determinants of 
longrun joblessness in spain. Columns 1 and 4 of the table show 
that workers displaced as a result of a cutback in work and those 
individually fired had long duration of joblessness compared to 
workers whose contract ended (the deleted group). Workers whose 
contract ended essentially have advance notice of displacement, and 
thus are likely to begin their search process earlier. Workers who 
are fired are likely to be negatively selected and have a harder 
time finding work thereafter (Gibbons and Katz 1989). The 
variables that reflect human capital -- education and previous job 
tenure -- have very different effects on duration of joblessness. 
Education reduces duration while previous tenure raises it.'7 If 
we interpret tenure as reflecting specific human capital, and 
education as reflecting general human capital, these differing 
effects suggest that specifically trained workers have greater 
problems coping with displacement, possibly because they suffer 
greater losses of earnings capacity and adjust their reservation 
wages relatively slowly. 
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Additional Estimat •• 
We made two further estimates of the effect of UI on longterm 
unemployment and of the shape of the underlying hazard rate, using 
more complicated econometrics. First, relaxing the Weibull 
assumption of a constant hazard rate, we estimated a non-parametric 
Cox proportional hazard model. In this specification, the dependent 
variable is the escape rate rather than the log duration of 
joblessness, so that the signs of the estimated parameters have the 
opposite meaning to those in the Wiebull formulation: a covariate 
with positive sign indicates an increase in the escape rate and 
thus a reduction in duration of joblessness. Column 1 of Table 4 
gives the estimated parameters in the Cox model. They confirm our 
principal findings: UI eligibility substantially increases the 
length of time jobless, while being a household head reduces it. 
They al so confirm that education and tenure have opposite effects 
on duration of joblessness. 
Second, to obtain the strongest possible test of the UI 
effect, we estimated a proportional hazard model with time varying 
covariates for eligibility for UI. To do this we organized our 
data into a three-month-persons file, in which individuals enter 
the file several times to reflect their time unemployed. Here, UI 
eligibility is measured by a person's status at each interval so 
that a person unemployed for six months but eligible for three 
months of UI is ceded eligible the first time he is in the file but 
not the second time. This approach provides an especially useful 
test of the effect of UI as it distinguishes the behavior of people 
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'. during and after eligibility. In this analysis we use twa 
different measures af the UI incentive. In calumn 2 af Table 4 aur 
measure (TRUI) is the manths af eligibility that a persan had in 
each interval: far instance, TRUI takes the value 5 manths if the 
persa n is in manth 1 af unemplayment and is eligible far 6 manths 
af UI; it is 2 manths if they are in manth 4 af unemplayment and 
eligible far 6 months af UI; and it is O if they have nat been or 
became ineligible. The results af these estimates canfirm that UI 
significantly reduces the prabability af leaving unemplayment. In 
calumn 3 af the table we use a slightly different specificatian af 
the UI variable ta take accaunt af the declining replacement rate 
as duratian af eligibility increases. The variable here, BENEF, 
takes the value 0.8 far the first six manths af eligibility (when 
peaple receive 80% af their previaus wage); 0.7 far the next six 
manths; 0.6 far the remaining periad af eligibility; and zero far 
the rest af time af unemplayment. It has an even stranger effect on 
the estimated hazard. The stranger estimated relatian between UI 
and duration of jablessness as we imprave aur measure af the 
economic incentive of UI supparts a behaviaral interpretation of 
our findings. 
What is the shape of the hazard rate in the Cax prapartianal 
hazards model? TO calculate this we estimated survival functians 
using the model in calumn 1 af Table 4.'8 Once the survival 
functian was recavered, we regressed lag(-log (S» on a canstant 
and lagarithm af manths af unemplayment spell. The caefficient an 
the lag of unemployment is aur estimate af the duration dependence 
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parameter, corrected for the relevant covariates. '9 The results of 
this exercise are given in Table S, which records estimated 
duration dependence parameters for the sample as a whole, for those 
who became unemployed in the period 1981-85, and for those who 
became unemployed earlier. With no covariates the estimated 
relation between the hazard and duration is .65 for the entire 
sample and below one for the subsamples as well, consistent with 
the declining hazard shown in Figure 3. Inclusion of the 
covariates in the Cox model raises the estimated duration parameter 
to .79, indicating measured heterogeneity in our sample. 
When we decompose the sample between persons who lost their 
job in 1981-85, and those who lost their job earlier, however, we 
see that the overall sample result is due to very different 
patterns for the two groups. The estimated duration dependence 
parameter is .97 after controlling for observed heterogeneity for 
those who became jobless in 1981-85, implying little or no duration 
dependence, but is significantly downward sloping for those who 
lost their job prior to 1981. This pattern mirrors the differences 
in the Weibull model duration dependence estimates, also given in 
the table: a rising hazard for people who lost their job in 1981-85 
and a falling hazard tor people who lost their jOb earlier. The 
difference in the shapea may reflect differences in unobserved 
heterogeneity between the periods, with greater heterogeneity in 
the earlier period when few people were displaced compared to the 
latter period when relatively many were displaced. 20 Since 
unobserved heterogeneity produces declining hazards,21 the overall 
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implication is that tha ha.ard rata did Dot daoliDa ror par.on. 
displacad iD 1981-85. This casts doubt on any explanation of 
longrun unemployment as resulting from an extraordinary adverse 
effect of longrun joblessness on labor skills and the probability 
of finding a jobo 
Accaptanca Waqa. aDd Job. 
The other sida of the search analysis of unemployment relates 
to the wages and jobs the unemployed eventually obtain. To what 
extent does longterm unemployment induce workers to accept less 
desireable jobs and reduced wages? Does U1 enable workers to find 
better employment as a result of extended jOb search? 
Table 6 seeks to answer these questions. ll Columns 1-3 record 
regression coefficients of the effect of U1 eligibility and 
duration of joblessness on the log wages of unemployed workers who 
obtained jobs at the time of the survey, controlling for standard 
demographic and human capital variables. 2' As the re-employed are 
a select group of the jobless we include an inverse MilIs ratio 
(based on the probit in column 2 of Table 2 for whether someone who 
became unemployed obtained a job at the time of the survey) in the 
column 3 calculation: it had little effect on the results. Column 
4 turns from wages to the type of job a person obtains: it records 
probit coefficients for the probability that a re-employed worker 
obtains a regular full-time jobo 
The estimates show substantial effects for both U1 and 
duration of joblessness on wages and the type of job the unemployed 
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obtain. Tha column 1 ragression indicatas that eligibility for UI 
has a moderate 3.6% positive effect on earnings, which rises to 
5.7% when we control for duration of unemployment and selectivity 
bias. While lack of data on the individuals' earnings on the 
previous job makes inferences about the impact of longterm 
unemployment on wages shaky, these estimates are consistent with 
rational search behavior as the jobless with UI wait until they 
find a higher paying job even exclusive of any value placed on 
leisure during the unemployment spell. Consider, for example, a 
worker whose spell of joblessness is increased by 6 months by UI. 
During this time he receives approximately SO% of his previous pay, 
so that his annual earnings are about 10% «lOO-SO) x 1/2 year) 
lower. If the workers' pay is 3.6% higher as a result of the 
extended search, the payback period is less than 3 years. 
Column 2 shows that ayear of joblessness reduces earnings of 
workers by about 3%. We interpret this in the framework of the 
search theory model as reflecting depreciation of work skills with 
joblessness. In the standard search model the reservation wage 
(W*) is related to the value of search (V) and the relevant 
interest rate (r) (Mortensen 19S6): w* = rV. An n% depreciation 
in earnings capacity or human capital due to joblessness decreases 
the value of search proportionately, and thus has a proportionate 
impact on W*. If the sole reason for the decline in earnings with 
duration is depraciation of human capital, the 3% coefficient would 
be equal to the coefficient on experience in an earnings equation 
for never displaced workers. In fact, in an earnings equation for 
lS 
• 
never displaced workers,2' we obtain a coefficient on experience of 
.018, which suggests that the reservation wage of workers falls for 
other reasons as well (i.e. liquidity constraints (Mortensen 1986); 
learning (McCall 1989; Burdett and Vishwanath 1988)). 
The coefficients on other variables in the wage regressions of 
Table 6 are consistent with a human capital interpretation of the 
effect of longterm joblessness on earnings. The variable SAMEOCC, 
which takes the value 1 if a person is re-employed in the same 
occupation, is positive, as one would expect if there are 
occupation-specific skills. Returns to experience and to education 
are lower for workers who were displaced than for workers who were 
not displaced (the experience coefficient for the not displaced was 
.018 while the coefficient on schooling was .05 -- see note 22); 
which suggests greater losses in human capital for those with 
greater past investments. Again, however, the absence of wages for 
individuals prior to displacement means that we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the results reflect unobserved skill differences. 
The final and most striking result in Table 6 is found in the 
column 4 probit equation. It shows that UI eligibility has a huge 
effect on obtaining a regular full-time job, while duration of 
joblessness has, by contrast, a substantial negative effect. The 
coefficient on UI implies that a person in the sample with the mean 
characteristics and who is eligible for UI had a 12 percent higher 
chance of obtaining a full-time regular job than that person would 
have had absent UI. The coefficient on duration implies that ayear 
of unemployment reduces the chances of obtaining a regular-full-
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time job by some 7 percentage points. That UI operates largely 
through the type of job it enables people to find is indicated 
further in the reduced coefficient of UI in the In earnings 
equation when we add the regular full-time variable to the earnings 
regression in column 3. 
Conclusion 
Our findings -- that UI substantially prolongs the duration of 
unemployment in spain; that longterm unemployment is concentrated 
among secondary workers for whom the family serves as a form of UI; 
that the hazard rate was relatively flat among those displaced in 
1981-85 when unemployment skyrocketed; and that duration of 
unemployment reduces wages and the chances of obtaining a regular 
full-time job -- are broadly consistent with the implications of 
labor supply and search analysis for understanding the behavior of 
the longterm unemployed. The estimated magnitudes of the effects 
of duration on the hazard and on earnings are, however, 
inconsistent with the view that long durations of unemployment 
creates a class of unemployables. To the contrary, they suggest 
that longterm unemployment is more a problem of a slow rate of 
receipt of job offers relative to reservation wages (which are 
raised by UI), than one of extraordinary loss of labor market 
skills as time unemployed proceeds. If our results are correct, 
economic expansion in Spain will reduce longterm unemployment at a 
reasonable pace. In addition, the evidence of improved earnings 
20 
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with U1 eliqibility suqqests that the UI-induced increased jOb 
search has an economic payoff for those workers. 
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Endnotes 
l. In 1985 the rate of unemployment in Spain was aboye 20% and 
incomplete spells of unemployment averaged more than two years. 
Fina 1988 analyses the causes of this high unemployment. 
2. Studies have addressed the effect of U1 on duration of 
unemployment. See, for example, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1977), 
Moffitt (1985) and Katz and Meyer (1988) for estimates for the 
united States; and Atkinson et al. (1984) and Narendranathan et 
al. (1985) for estimates for the united Kingdom. But they have 
deal with much shorter spells of unemployment than in Spain. 
3. We classify persons who lost their job when their contract 
ended as involuntary job losers. We differentiate them from 
other job losers in some calculations. 
4. We deleted 62 persons with over 120 months of unemployment as 
likely to be out of the work force. 1ncluding them had no effect 
on our results. 
5. Some workers who said they were actively looking for a job 
since becoming displaced were not looking for work in the 
reference week. We did some calculations excluding them from our 
sample, obtained the same results as in the text, and included 
them in the calculations. 
6. To determine the number of workers actually employed, we 
applied further minar restrictions to allow for persons not 
working because of illness, vacation, etc., and for problems of 
similar nature. Moreover, as the survey contains questions for 
those who did no work in the previous week aimed at revealing 
occasional work done in the last three months, we impose having 
worked a minimum of 13 hours per week in the last three months to 
consider a worker as currently employed. 
7. The detailed ECVT questions on underground economic activity 
reduce the rate of unemployment by just 3 or so percentage 
points. 
8. We attribute the modest difference between the estimates to 
inclusion of youths and those who leave their jobs voluntarily in 
the EPA but not in our data. 
9. This sample is composed of workers who reported never changing 
firms; some may have been out of work at one time but were 
recalled by the same firmo The sample excludes workers who have 
moved without experiencing displacement (voluntary turnover) or 
who were displaced without unemployment. 
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10. This definition as sumes that persons with incomplete spells 
of 6+ months will average complete spells of one year or more. We 
also examined those with complete or incomplete spells of 12+ 
months and obtained similar results to those reported. 
11. See Dell'Aringa and Lodovici (1988) for an analysis of the 
determinants of unemployment duration for displaced workers in 
Italy. 
12. We investigated whether non-eligibility because the worker 
did not make payments to the UI system or because the worker held 
a job for too short a period had different effects on duration of 
unemployment. The differences were insignificant. 
13. In addition, many unemployed youths never he Id a job and thus 
were never eligible for UI benefits in the first place. 
14. In an uncensored sample, the survival function is the 
cumulative survival rate -- proportion of persons who remain 
unemployed at the end of each interval of time. As our sample 
involves right censoring, the product limit or Kaplan-Meier 
estimate of the survival function provides the correct 
statistics. Let n, be the number of workers unemployed (risk-set) 
in the beginning of the interval i, and d, the number of workers 
who find jobs in the course of that intervalo Then p,=(n,-d,)/n, 
is the proportion of workers who remain unemployed at the end of 
the interval 1. The product limit estimate is P,=Pl"P2" .p,. 
Notice that l-p, is the empirical hazard rate. See Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice 1980, pp. 10-16 for more details. 
15. The model in reduced form is Y = xp + ae, where Y=log(T), 
p=-ab is a vector of unknown regression parameters, a = l/a is an 
unknown Weibull scale parameter, and e is a vector of errors with 
an extreme-value distribution (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980, p. 
24). The model is estimated by maximumlikelihood using a Newton-
Raphson algorithm through SAS programo See Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice, 1980, pp. 84-86, and Lancaster 1979, for details about 
the form of the likelihood function. 
16. In addition, we estimated an exponential model with a 0-1 
dummy variable for UI eligibility and calculated the expected 
mean duration for those eligible and for those ineligible for UI. 
The coefficient on the dummy for UI eligibility was .22. The 
expected mean duration for those ineligible was 27 months, so 
that eligibility raised duration of joblessness by nearly 6 
months, controlling for other differences between workers. Thus, 
this model gives comparable results to those in the texto 
17. Given the definition of UI eligibility, it is highly 
correlated with previous job tenure. This might be an explanation 
why eligibility is not significant among workers displaced for 
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reasons other than ending of contracto Note that tenure has a 
strong effect on duration of unemployment for the same group of 
workers. 
18. After estimating the time fixed Cox model, we recovered the 
survival function given the covariates using the STATA programo 
See Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980, pp. 84-87. 
19. In the Weibull distribution, the survival function is 
S(t)=exp[-(ht)"]. Hence, log[-log S(t)]=a(log h+log t) and the 
coefficient of lag t, given S(t) as an estimate of the survival 
function, mea sures duration dependence. 
20. Some workers displaced befare 1981 were still unemployed at 
the end of 1985. Those who found a job are clustered either 
around short spells or around very long ones. This implies that 
most people found a new job quickly and kept them thereafter. 
Many of those who found a job in the period, and moved 
voluntarily afterward, are not in the sample of displaced 
workers. If they were displaced again their latest spell has 
precedence in our sample since the survey only reports the last 
spell of unemployment. 
21. Those with higher propensities of finding jobs exit the 
sample earlier than those with innately lower hazard rates. 
22. See Addison and Portugal (1989) and Podgursky and Swaim 
(1987) for evidence for the U.S. 
23. As wage variable in the ECVT is coded, we have converted it 
into a continuous variable by taking the median of the intervals. 
24. The estimates for workers not displaced are the following: 
CONSTo 
SEX 
EXPER 
EXPER2 
EDUC 
ADJ.R-SQ. 
N 
Coeff. t 
9.745 
0.139 
0.018 
(233.2) 
(12.84) 
(15.37) 
(-13.01) 
(39.10) 
-0.0004 
0.053 
.50 
7140 
Other variables included are: WCOLL, NCHIL, OTHERW, REGULF, 
and dummies for regions and sectors. 
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TABLE l. - DEFIl'IITIONS ANO IlEANS OF VARIABLES IN ECV'f. BY ElIPLOYHENT fUIiEIlPLOYHENT STATUS 
Dbpl. Never Dlopl. Shortrun Longrun 
joble .. dbpl. non-joble .. unempl. unempl. 
DURATION Kontha unemployed 19.419 3.536 29.923 
LONG DUR -1 1f longterm unempl. 0.602 0.0 1.0 
AGE Age at survey date 36.301 38.046 40.613 33.990 37.831 
AGEDISP Age at diaplacement 33.390 36.889 32.075 34.249 
SU -1 if male 0.690 0.588 0.808 .751 .650 
EDUC Years of achooling 6.993 8.647 6.959 7.182 6.869 
YDISPO -1 1f diap. before 1981 0.263 0.609 .219 .293 
YDISP13 
-1 1f diap. 1981-1983 0.272 0.139 .134 .364 
YDISP4 
-1 1f dloplaced in 1984 0.173 0.072 .107 .217 
YDISP5 
-1 1f displaced in 1985 0.262 0.171 .504 .102 
FIRED 
-1 1f individually fired 0.172 0.163 .136 .196 
DOIIN 
-1 1f firm shut dovn 0.261 0.306 .181 .315 
CUTBACK 
-1 1f cut back on york 0.075 0.066 .053 .090 
PROV.P. 
-1 1f fired after 0.017 0.017 .021 .015 
proviaionary period 
END -1 if end of contract 0.471 0.446 .607 .382 
IlCOLL 
-1 if White collar 0.179 0.494 0.194 .165 .188 
HUD 
-1 if household head 0.552 0.520 0.719 .563 .545 
NCHIL Dependent children l.083 0.990 l. 259 1. 092 l. 076 
OTHERIl Othera vorking 0.499 0.612 0.453 .512 .491 
in the famlly 
ELIGUI -1 1f eligible for UI 0.697 0.753 .582 .773 
ELlG36 -1 if eligible for 0.173 0.107 .200 .155 
3-6 montha of UI 
ELIG912 -1 if eligible for 0.066 0.047 .057 .072 
9-12 montha of UI 
ELIGl518 -1 if eligible for 0.458 0.5Q8 .325 .547 
15-18 montha of UI 
AD55 -1 if AGEDISP>-55 0.104 0.103 .090 .114 
TENURE Previoua job tenure 4.599 5.303 3.181 5.541 
EXP Age-Education-6 23.306 23.370 27.634 20.799 24.963 
REGULF 
-1 1f re-empl. in a 0.591 0.778 0.745 .577 .609 
regular full-time job 
" 
LIlAGE Log aonthly net eaminga 10.586 10.686 10.668 10.599 10.570 
in current job 
SAKESECT -1 if re-employed in 
the .... sector 
0.486 0.489 .555 .403 
SAKEOCCU -1 if re-employed in 0.539 0.465 .621 .442 
.' 
the lame occupatlon 
SAKPLE SIZE 4517 7237 858 1798 2719 
Source: Tabulated from ECVT aurvey. 
TABLE 2.- ESTIMATES OF PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR CONDITIONAL 
PROBABILITIES OF JOBLESS STATUS. (T STATISTICS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Depend. Longrun Currently Displaced Displaced -1 
varo : unemp1. -1 employed -1 joblesa -1 
Sample: All displaced All displaced All displaced All vorker. joble .. joble .. vorker. 
ELIGUI 0.274 ( 4.92) -0.137 (-2.53) -0.046 (-0.79) 
SU -0.401 (-6.75) 0.536 ( 9.63) -0.172 (-2.70) .068 ( 2.23) 
AGEDISP 0.008 ( 2.98) -0.017 (-6.43) -0.010 (-3.74) 
AGE -.008 (-7.60) 
EDUC -0.007 (-0.98) 0.027 ( 3.69) -0.026 (-3.53) -.034 (-9.70) 
TENURE 0.008 ( 2.03) -O .011 (-2.83) 0.001 ( 0.43) 
YDISPO 1.156 (18.74) 1.242 (19 .60) -0.684(-11.18) 
YDISP13 1. 578 (24.98) 0.420 7.20) 0.115 1. 63) 
YDISP4 1.413 (20.78) 0.188 2.93) 0.251 3.02) 
FIRED 0.282 4.31) -0.123 (-1.95) 0.082 1. 21) 
DOIiN 0.189 2.99) 0.031 ( 0.50) 0.044 ( 0.69) 
CUTBACK 0.232 2.48) -0.125 (-1.40) 0.135 ( 1. 40) 
PROV.P. -0.028 (-0.16) 0.008 0.04) -0.056 (-0.32) 
"l/COLLAR 0.044 ( 0.67) 0.092 1.43) 0.030 ( 0.44) -.352(-12.63) 
HEAD -0.343 (-5.39) 0.519 8.51) -O .186 (-2.73) .034 0.99) 
NCHIL -0.003 (-0.19) 0.008 ( 0.48) 0.005 ( 0.31) .018 1. 89) 
OTHERW -0.025 (-0.73) 0.006 ( 0.14) -0.059 (-1. 64) -.108 (-6.09) 
AD55 0.325 ( 2.94) -0.599 (-5.49) 0.101 0.99) 
CONSTo -1.160 (-5.62) -0.230 (-1.07) 2.062 9.23) .235 ( 2.11) 
LaG LIKEL. -2190 -2380 -1983 -7312 
N 4201 4201 5010 12440 
Note: All the reare •• lon. lnclude 17 rea10n and 4 sector dumm1ea 
TABLE 3.- ESTIHATED EFFECT OF VARIABLES ON UNEKPLOYHENT DURATION 
USING VEIBULL MODEL. (ASYHPTOTIC STANDARD ERRORS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Entire .... ple End af contract Other rea.ena Displ. 1981-85 
ELIG36 0.185 (0.074) 0.315 (0.091) 0.003 (O .137) 0.211 (0.063) 
ELIG912 0.193 (0.103) 0.354 (0.147) -0.019 (0.150) 0.234 (0.087) 
ELIG1518 0.255 (0.065) 0.336 (0.102) 0.164 (0.093) 0.343 (0.084) 
AGEDISP 0.011 (0.002) 0.015 (0.004) 0.008 (0.003) 0.023 (0.003) 
SEl: -0.714 (0.064) -0.635 (0.095) -0.783 (0.088) -0.422 (0.064) 
TENURE 0.013 (0.004) 0.001 (0.008) 0.016 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 
EDUC -0.034 (0.007) -0.024 (0.010) -0.041 (0.009) -0.017 (0.007) 
YDISPO 1.100 (0.073) 1.208 (0.107) 0.943 (0.115) 1. 396 (0.057) 
YDISP13 1. 357 (0.069) 1. 397 (0.095) 1. 286 (O .112) 
YDISP4 0.864 (0.079) 0.806 (0.102) 0.879 (0.131) 0.831 (0.064) 
FIRED 0.227 (0.068) 0.198 (0.071) 0.119 (0.072) 
DOllN 0.007 (0.064) -0.028 (0.070) 
CUTBACK 0.233 (0.097) 0.222 (0.093) 0.128 (0.109) 
PROV. P. 0.020 (0.167) 0.005 (0.173) 0.158 (0.166) 
WCOLL -0.03 (0.065) -0.073 (O .110) -0.018 (0.080) -O .110 (0.068) 
HEAD -0.58 (0.063) -0.579 (0.089) -0.629 (0.089) -0.475 (0.064) 
NCHIL -0.00 (0.017) -0.001 (0.027) 0.000 (0.022) -0.016 (0.020) 
OTHERW -0.01 (0.036) 0.046 (0.052) -0.081 (0.050) 0.040 (0.036) 
AD55 1.015 (0.152) 1.097 (0.263) 0.954 (0.184) 0.656 (0.166) 
CONSTo 2.423 (0.208) 1.924 (0.311) 2.932 (0.289) 1.771 (0.231) 
SCALE 1.029 (0.018) 1. 045 (0.027) 1.000 (0.024) 0.824 (0.019) 
LOG LIKEL. -4961 -2358 -2574 -2998 
N 4201 1982 2219 3062 
Note: All the regreaalonl lnclude 11 regían And 4 sector dummle. 
TABLE 4.- ESTIHATES OF EFFECT OF VARIABLES ON UNEKPLOYKENT DURATIOH 
USING Á COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL. (T STATISTICS) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Time fill:ed Time varying Time varying 
covariatel covariates covariatel 
ELIG36 -.176 -2.43) 
ELIG912 -.179 -1. 78) 
ELIG1518 -.243 -3.82) 
!RUI -.030 ( -6.13) 
BENEF -.670 -8.55) 
AGEDISP - .011 -4.34) - .011 -4.34) -.010 -4.24) 
SEl: .643 10.40) .630 10.22) .635 10.29) 
TENURE 
- .011 -2.56) -.007 -1. 78) -.007 -1.82) 
EDUC .028 4.08) .028 4.12) .028 4.03) 
YDISPO -.747 -9.57) -.613 -7.81) -.658 -8.82) 
YDISP13 -1.13 (-14.99) -1. 052 (-13.74) -1.090 (-14.44) 
YDISP4 -.757 -9.38) -.718 -8.87) -.741 -9.16) 
FIRRD -.217 -3.27) - .181 -2.73) -.176 -2.67) 
DOWH -.018 -0.29) .007 0.12) .017 0.28) 
CUTBACK -.204 -2.17) - .175 -1.87) -.167 -1.79) 
PROV.P. -.034 -0.21) -.019 -0.12) -.039 -0.24) 
WCOLL .035 0.56) .031 0.50) .036 0.57) 
IIEAJ) 
.527 8.62) .526 8.63) .542 8.87) 
NCRIL .005 0.33) .008 0.48) .007 0.43) 
OTHERW .010 0.29) .009 0.26) .008 0.24) 
AD55 -.955 -6.50) -.943 -6.43) -.964 -6.57) 
LOO LIKEL. -16187 -16176 -16158 
N 4201 17371 17371 
Note: All the regressiona lnclude 17 reglan and 4 sector dummIes. 
TABLE 5.- ESTIKATED DEPENDENCE PARAKETERS ( S.D.) BY PERIOD OF 
DISPLACEMENT AND KODEL 
\/hale aample 1981-1985 <1979-1980 
Empirical hazard .65 .70 .60 
(Kaplan-Keier) (.005) (.010) (.007) 
Non-parametric .79 .97 .71 
(Ca", model) (.007) (.012) (.014) 
Parametric .972 1. 212 .81 
(Weibu11 model) (.019) (.020) (.034) 
N 4517 3326 1191 
Note: See text for tbe v.y these valuea have b.en calculated. 
TABLE 6.- ESTIHATES 01 THE EllECT 01 UI ELIGIBILITY ANO DURATION 01 JOBLESSNESS 
ON WAGES Ah~ TYPE 01 JOB OBTAINED BY RE-EHPLOYED WORXERS 
Probit lIOde1 
Ordinary Least Square. regreasiona If regular 
Dependent variable: 10g month1y net eamings fu11-time Job -1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONST 9.989 (140.1) 9.933 (140.6) 9.957 (143.1) -0.929 (-3.03) 
SEX 0.130 6.34) 0.073 3.42) 0.123 6.12) 0.053 0.61) 
EXPER 0.007 2.55) 0.007 2.84) 0.007 2.49) 0.009 0.79) 
EXPER2 -0.0001 (-2.18) -0.0001 (-1.81) -0.0001 (-2.10) -0.0001 (-0.85) 
TEli1lRE -0.0002 (-0.13) 0.001 ( 0.91) -0.0001 (-0.08) 0.0001 0.02) 
EDUC 0.029 (10.64) 0.028 (10.39) 0.028 (10.61) 0.027 2.27) 
YDISPO 0.066 ( 3.03) 0.036 ( 1. 69) 0.811 8.27) 
YDISP13 -0.007 (-0.32) -0.028 (-1. 27) 0.550 5.71) 
YDISP4 0.026 ( 1. 05) 0.006 ( 0.26) 0.408 3.87) 
FIRED -0.039 (-1.81) -0.021 (-1.00) -0.047 (-2.23) 0.210 2.27) 
DOWN -0.004 (-0.23) -0.007 (-0.39) -0.018 (-0.97) 0.328 3.75) 
CUTBACK -0.020 (-0.64) 0.003 ( 0.09) -0.029 (-0.97) 0.284 2.06) 
PROV.P. -0.028 (-0.54) -0.030 (-0.57) -0.045 (-0.89) 0.381 1. 70) 
WCOLL 0.131 7.13) 0.118 6.49) 0.117 6.53) 0.136 1.45) 
HEAD 0.079 3.79) 0.023 1.05) 0.054 2.63) 0.442 4.97) 
NCHIL 0.009 1. 47) 0.008 1. 35) 0.010 1. 72) -0.025 (-0.92) 
OTHERW -0.003 (-0.33) -0.005 (-O .49) . -0.010 (-0.94) 0.131 ( 2.69) 
SAHESECT 0.008 0.47) 0.005 0.30) 0.009 0.57) -0.035 (-0.49) 
SAHEOCCU 0.093 5.46) 0.079 4.67) 0.083 4.96) 0.148 2.05) 
ELIGUI 0.036 1. 97) 0.057 3.13) 0.022 1. 22) 0.311 4.00) 
REGULF 0.158 (10.18) 
DURATION -0.034 (-6.65) -0.171 (-7.75) 
LAHlIDA 0.127 6.25) 
ADJ. R-SQ. .25 .28 .29 
LOG LIKEL. -1138 
N 2001 2001 2001 2001 
Note.: A11 the re!re •• ion. Inc1ud. 11 region and 4 .ector dummie •. 
In regre •• on (4) .ector and occupation are tho.e of the previous jobo 
Unemp10yaent duration i. con.idered in year •. 
non-u; e!;g. 
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